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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The New Haven School of International Law offered a significant, 
process-based rejoinder to the realism and positivism that had dominated 
international relations theory in the United States since the close of World 
War II. Whereas international relations realists viewed international law as 
merely a product of state power relations, 1  and positivists dismissed 
international law entirely because it lacked both sovereign commands and a 
rule of recognition,2 scholars of the New Haven School studied law as a social 
                                                                                                                                                                         
† Jesse Root Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; Visiting 
Professor and Visiting Research Scholar, Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs. This 
Article is based on remarks delivered on March 10, 2007 at The Yale Journal of International Law Fifth 
Annual Young Scholars Conference: The “New” New Haven School: International Law—Past, Present 
& Future. I am grateful to Kamari Clarke, Sarah H. Cleveland, Laura Dickinson, Harold Hongju Koh, 
Janet Koven Levit, Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, and Andrew Willard for helpful comments. 
1. See, e.g., EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 80 (Palgrave 2001) (1939) (rejecting 
internationalism/cosmopolitanism and stating that the principles commonly invoked in international 
politics were “unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national 
interest at a particular time”); GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1984) 
(“[T]he belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints” is 
a perspective that “runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years.”); HANS J. 
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 5 (5th ed. rev. 1978) 
(noting that the “main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”). 
2. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994). 
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process of authoritative decisionmaking.3 Such a study necessarily expanded 
the state-focused perspective of both the realists and positivists by drawing 
attention to ongoing interactions among variously situated bureaucratic and 
institutional actors. 
Now, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the gaze has 
widened still further, as international law scholars (and those studying law and 
globalization more generally) increasingly recognize that we inhabit a world 
of multiple normative communities, some of which impose their norms 
through officially sanctioned coercive force and formal legal processes, but 
many of which do not. These norms have varying degrees of impact, of 
course, but it has become clear that ignoring such normative assertions 
altogether as somehow not “law” is not a useful strategy. Accordingly, what 
we see emerging is an approach to international law drawn from legal 
pluralism.4 
As such, this new international law scholarship owes a debt not only to 
Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, Michael Reisman and the other 
practitioners of the New Haven School, but to another Yale Law School 
professor whose name is rarely associated with international law: Robert 
Cover. Cover, like other legal pluralists,5 insisted that law does not reside 
solely in the coercive commands of a sovereign power. Instead, Cover argued 
that law is constantly constructed through the contest among various norm-
generating communities. 6 Thus, although “official” norms articulated by 
sovereign entities obviously count as “law,” to Cover such official assertions 
of prescriptive or adjudicatory jurisdiction are only some of the many ways in 
which normative commitments arise.7 
                                                                                                                                                                         
3. See, e.g., Symposium, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, 79 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 266 (1985). 
4. See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to 
Classification, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 15 (Leon Lipson & S. Wheeler eds., 1986) (“[N]ot all the phenomena related to law and not 
all that are law-like have their source in the government.”). For further discussions of legal pluralism, 
see CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002); 
David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425; Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and 
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 28-34 (1981); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 
J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986); and Sally Engel Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 
(1988). For more detailed discussions of legal pluralism in the international context, see BOAVENTURA 
DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (2002); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM 
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-
Garavito eds., 2005); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2007); Sally Engle Merry, International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Towards a Spatial Global 
Legal Pluralism, STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2007); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of 
Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada 
Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345 (2005); and Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 
1997).  
5. See supra note 4. 
6. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43-46 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative]; Robert Cover, 
The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179 (1985) [hereinafter Cover, 
Folktales of Justice]. 
7. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 6, at 43 (“The position that only the state 
creates law . . . confuses the status of interpretation with the status of political domination.”). See also 
Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 6, at 181 (arguing that “all collective behavior entailing 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=970688
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Cover’s insights are crucial for understanding today’s global legal 
pluralism. For example, the Project on International Courts and Tribunals has 
identified approximately 125 international institutions, all issuing decisions 
that have some effect on state legal authorities, though those effects are 
sometimes deemed binding, sometimes merely persuasive, and often fall 
somewhere between the two.8 Meanwhile, scholars have sought to define and 
understand “transnational legal process,” the ways in which nation-states 
come to internalize international or transnational norms, even when those 
norms are not directly backed by coercive power.9 Others have studied non-
traditional legal actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
their role in defining (and sometimes enforcing) legal standards.10 And, many 
non-state communities seek to inculcate norms transnationally, subnationally, 
or supranationally, whether through various forms of private ordering, 
industry standard-setting, political lobbying, or other means. This messy 
world, where official, quasi-official, and unofficial norms are pursued by 
multiple communities controlling various means of coercive and persuasive 
authority, would have been very familiar to Cover. 
This Article discusses Cover’s work and its relationship to the New 
Haven School of International Law, while arguing that Cover’s emphasis on 
norm-generating communities—rather than nation-states—and his celebration 
of “jurisdictional redundancy”11 provide a useful analytical framework for 
understanding the plural normative centers that are the focus of much current 
international law scholarship. Moreover, a pluralist perspective on 
international law provides a powerful critique to the latest incarnation of 
realism, now newly dressed up in the trappings of rational choice theory.12 
Following Cover, international law scholars can extricate themselves from 
endless debates about whether or not international law should count as law. 
Instead, the focus can shift to the variety of normative assertions, the impact 
of such assertions on legal consciousness, and the way these norms are 
deployed by actors both within and without governmental bureaucracies. 
Accordingly, I suggest that, if a “new” New Haven School is emerging, it 
would do well to embrace Robert Cover as an important intellectual forbear. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
systematic understandings of our commitments to future worlds” can lay equal claim to the word “law”) 
(emphasis added). 
8. See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, The International Judiciary in Context 
(Nov. 2004), available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_C4.pdf.  
9. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). 
See also Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 
(1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2604 
(1997) (book review).  
10. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under 
International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (2001) (observing that “private 
individuals and non-governmental organizations acting both internationally and domestically are 
contributing to the emergence of new international norms. These new international norms confer greater 
rights and obligations on private individuals and firms, shifting the focus of international law.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
11. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). 
12. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005). For a critique along the lines I have in mind, see Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits 
of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra). 
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Finally, I argue that translating Cover’s ideas to the international realm 
provides a useful site for testing Cover’s insight that law can be 
“jurisgenerative” and not just “jurispathic.”13 If judges in nation-state courts 
are inevitably “people of violence” because their interpretations “kill off” 
competing normative assertions,14 the international and transnational arenas 
may provide important contrasts. Without as much coercive power in 
evidence, those asserting norms in the international or transnational arena are 
less likely to be able to kill off opposing interpretations; more often they must 
use rhetorical persuasion to inculcate ideas over time. For example, to the 
extent that international human rights are now an important element of global 
legal consciousness, it is because of a long process of rhetorical persuasion, 
treaty codification, and other forms of “soft law” slowly changing the 
international consensus, not because of positivist decree. Thus, even as 
Cover’s insights help us to understand the global plural order today, this plural 
system also illuminates Cover’s own work by providing an important example 
of how law can (at least sometimes) function as the jurisgenerative bridge to 
“alternity”15 that Cover posited. 
Part II of this Article attempts a bridge of its own, between Cover’s 
work and that of the original New Haven School of International Law. While 
briefly summarizing some of the core insights of both, I point to several 
important similarities (as well as obvious differences) between Cover’s work 
and that of McDougal, Lasswell, et al. Part III then argues that Harold Hongju 
Koh’s theory of transnational legal process—arguably the genesis of the 
“new” New Haven School approach—arises directly from a combination of 
the original New Haven School’s focus on international law as social process 
and Cover’s focus on jurisgenerative norm-generating communities. By 
joining these two perspectives, Koh turned the gaze of international law 
scholarship towards the ways in which international and transnational norms 
are internalized into the practices (and sometimes the formal laws) of nation-
states. Part IV suggests six ways in which scholars are building on Koh’s 
transnational legal process framework, pushing the model in more pluralist 
directions. This pluralist vision effectively shifts the scholarly focus yet again, 
from “international law” to the more capacious idea of “law and 
globalization.”16 Finally, Part V considers the idea that the global legal arena 
might, at least some of the time, be “jurisgenerative,” opening up spaces for 
contestation and creative innovation and effecting important changes in legal 
consciousness over time. This jurisgenerative vision, which, I argue, is a core 
underlying component of the emerging “new” New Haven School, sharply 
contrasts with rational choice models that ignore such jurisgenerative pluralist 
processes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
13. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 6, at 25. 
14. Id. at 53. 
15. Id. at 9 (“Alternity” can be understood as “the ‘other than the case,’ the counter-factual 
propositions, images, shapes of will and evasion with which we charge our mental being and by means 
of which we build the changing, largely fictive milieu for our somatic and our social existence.”). 
16. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005). 
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II. PROCESS AND PLURALISM: THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORK OF ROBERT COVER 
At first blush, it may seem odd to tie the work of Robert Cover to that of 
the New Haven School. After all, although Cover’s teaching career at Yale 
overlapped those of McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, it does not appear that 
any member of the New Haven School ever so much as cited Cover. And, for 
his part, Cover did not focus much on international law at all, aside from a 
brief section on the Nuremberg trials in his essay The Folktales of Justice: 
Tales of Jurisdiction.17 Yet, for the purpose of articulating a pluralist approach 
to international law, we can see some core similarities between the two bodies 
of work. 
Turning first to the New Haven School, it is impossible to accurately 
encapsulate in a few short paragraphs the vast literature produced by 
McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, and their associates.18 However, some of the 
key conceptual moves championed by the New Haven School open the door 
to a pluralist approach. Most importantly, the New Haven School offered a 
kind of socio-legal realism to combat the power-based realism that had 
dominated the early Cold War period.19 Thus, instead of assuming, as the 
power-based realists did, that states simply pursue unitary sets of interests 
(generally global domination and riches) and that international law is only 
instrumental,20 the New Haven School argued that rules—along with the legal 
and political processes that inevitably accompany such rules—matter.21 At the 
same time, however, rules did not matter to the New Haven School because of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
17. Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 6, at 197-202. 
18. Whether referred to as “Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence,” “Configurative Jurisprudence,” 
“Law, Science, and Policy,” or “The New Haven School,” the principal statement of the jurisprudence is 
found in Lasswell and McDougal’s two-volume treatise, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992). For 
earlier versions of the approach, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL 
INSECURITY (1935); HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY (1950); and MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 
(1960). Other key statements of the jurisprudence include: Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, 
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 
(1943); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 486 (1966-67); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About 
Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971); Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A 
Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137 (1953); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. 
Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative 
Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 188 (1968). For discussions of the New Haven School of International 
Law, see, for example, Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 
104 YALE L.J. 1991 (1995) (reviewing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE 
FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992)); William L. Morison, Myres S. 
McDougal and Twentieth-Century Jurisprudence: A Comparative Essay, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER 
AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 3 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. 
Weston eds., 1976); W. Michael Reisman, The View From the New Haven School of International Law, 
86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 118 (1992); Symposium, supra note 3. 
19. I am grateful to Janet Koven Levit for this particularly succinct formulation. I note that, 
although many of the ideas that came to be associated with the New Haven School were first developed 
prior to World War II, the School’s stance in the Cold War era is an important part of its influence.  
20. See supra note 1.  
21. McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, supra note 18, at 9-10 (arguing that 
international relations realism “underestimates the role of rules, and of legal processes in general, and 
over-emphasizes the importance of naked power”). 
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some sort of positivist reverence for such rules as “law.” Rather, rules were 
deemed important because they formed part of a “world constitutive process” 
in which political decisions were reached.22 
Accordingly, the New Haven School scholars turned their attention to an 
empirical analysis of how the messy process of decisionmaking in the 
international realm actually occurs. Again and again, New Haven School 
writings refer to law as a social process, not either a set of sovereign 
commands or a reflection of the unitary interests of nation-states. And though 
the School’s actual empirical analysis of the world constitutive process of 
authoritative decisionmaking was dauntingly complex, the significant move 
was that it turned the focus to the interactive process itself. 
In addition, the New Haven School recognized the potential importance 
of a wide variety of actors in this world constitutive process. Thus, the social 
processes studied by the New Haven School purported to embrace “all the 
interactions and interdeterminations of peoples across state lines.”23 Indeed, 
Reisman went so far as to explicitly turn Austinian positivism on its head, 
arguing that we should focus not on how the commanded should view the 
command of the sovereign, but instead on the ways in which we are all 
sovereign decision-makers at one time or another.24 Accordingly, Reisman 
argued, we must consider the process by which sovereigns (meaning all of us) 
reach decisions in the first place. 25  Not surprisingly, this diffusion of 
sovereign power was accompanied by an interest in what were dubbed 
“microlegal processes,” such as the “laws” implicated by everyday 
encounters. 26  In this turn, the New Haven School might even be said to 
embrace Eugen Ehrlich’s conception of a “living law” regulating social life 
largely independent of “official,” state-based law.27 
It is true, of course, that most of the New Haven School work did not go 
quite that far, and its policy orientation tended to keep it grounded in what 
were referred to as “authoritative” decisions that contributed to “world public 
order.”28 These references to “authority” and “order” (as well as other ideas 
such as “effective power”29) arguably reinserted a hierarchy of law in which 
states wielding coercive sanctions were given pride of place. Thus, it would be 
over-reaching to say that the New Haven School was fully pluralist in 
orientation. But in its two principal conceptual moves, it did open the door for 
a pluralist approach. First, it turned the attention from grand theorizing about 
geo-political power games to empirical analysis of how decisionmaking 
                                                                                                                                                                         
22. Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 253, 254-55 (1967) (referring to a process by which interactions among communities 
create “reciprocal demands, expectations, identities and operational patterns” which then lead to 
“specialized institutional practices” that have real force in “sustaining stable contact, or restoring 
severed relations”). 
23. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 18, at x. 
24. Michael Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the “Political Superior,” 23 
N. KY. L. REV. 605, 605-08 (1996). 
25. Id. at 607. 
26. See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999). 
27. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 14-38 
(Walter L. Moll trans., 1936). 
28. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 18, at x. 
29. Id.  
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actually occurs on the ground. And second, it suggested that the 
decisionmaking process includes a large variety of actors beyond unitary 
sovereign states. 
Robert Cover’s approach to law opened the door to multivalent 
processes still further. Like other legal pluralists,30 Cover refused to give state 
lawmaking any more legitimacy or authority than other normative 
communities. Thus, he argued that “all collective behavior entailing 
systematic understandings of our commitments to future worlds [can lay] 
equal claim to the word ‘law.’”31 This formulation deliberately denies the 
nation-state any special status as a law-giver. According to Cover, although  
such “official” behavior and “official” norms is not denied the dignity of ‘law’ . . . it must 
share the dignity with thousands of other social understandings. In each case the question 
of what is law and for whom is a question of fact about what certain communities believe 
and with what commitments to those beliefs.32  
Of course, Cover was not blind to the fact that some law-givers wield 
the power of coercive violence. Indeed, Cover frequently sought to make 
judges more aware of the violence they do, going so far as to say that judges 
are inevitably “people of violence.”33 Cover argued that, “[b]ecause of the 
violence they command, judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it. 
Theirs is the jurispathic office.”34 In this vision, judges use the force of the 
state to crush competing legal conceptions pushed by alternative normative 
communities. 
But at the same time, Cover’s vision opens up the possibility of creative 
alternatives, and he locates within legal forms a space for resistance, 
contestation, and adaptation. For example, in his one foray into international 
law, he acknowledges that the Nuremberg War Crimes trials were a form of 
victors’ justice.35 But then he argues that once the legal form of having trials 
for crimes against humanity was created, it could be appropriated by other 
normative communities and used against the powerful.36 Thus, he describes 
Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre’s trial of the Vietnam War as an attempt 
to appropriate the Nuremberg form. 37  Moreover, Cover acknowledges the 
impact of legal enunciations, whether state-based or not, on legal 
consciousness. He therefore defends the Nuremberg trials based on “the 
capacity of the event to project a new legal meaning into the future.”38 Such 
legal meaning was then available for others to use and build upon in 
subsequent iterations. 
Finally, Cover identified jurisdictional politics as an important locus for 
the clash of normative visions. According to Cover, law is “a bridge in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
30. See supra note 4. 
31. Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 6, at 181. 
32. Id. at 182. 
33. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 6, at 53. 
34. Id. 
35. See Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 6, at 199 (“The War Crimes tribunals of 1946 . 
. . employed the forms of jurisdiction in the interests of power.”).  
36. See id. at 200. 
37. See id. at 200-02. 
38. Id. at 198. 
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normative space” that connects the world that is with worlds that might be.39 
In The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, he makes it clear that it is in 
the assertion of jurisdiction itself that these norm-generating communities 
seize the language of law and articulate visions of future worlds. 40  If 
jurisdiction is, literally, the ability to speak as a community, then, he 
suggested, we can begin to develop a “natural law of jurisdiction,”41 where 
communities claim the authority to use the language of the law based on a 
right or entitlement that precedes the particular sovereignties of the present 
moment. Such jurisdictional assertions are significant because, even though 
they lack coercive power, they open a space for the articulation of legal norms 
that are often subsequently incorporated into official legal regimes. Indeed, 
once we recognize that the state does not hold a monopoly on the articulation 
and exercise of legal norms, we can see law as a terrain of engagement, where 
various communities debate different visions of alternative futures. 
The importance of multiple jurisdictional assertions is a key part of 
Cover’s essay, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy.42 Although this essay 
was focused on the variety of “official” law pronouncers in the U.S. federal 
system, Cover celebrated the benefits that accrue from having multiple 
overlapping jurisdictional assertions. Such benefits included greater 
possibility for error correction, a more robust field for norm articulation, and a 
larger space for creative innovation.43 And though Cover acknowledged that it 
might seem perverse “to seek out a messy and indeterminate end to conflicts 
which may be tied neatly together by a single authoritative verdict,” he 
nevertheless argued that we should “embrace” a system “that permits tensions 
and conflicts of the social order” to be played out in the jurisdictional 
structure of the system.44 Thus, Cover’s pluralism, though here focused on 
U.S. federalism, can be said to embrace the creative possibilities inherent in 
multiple overlapping jurisdictions asserted by both state and non-state entities 
in whatever context they arise. 
Most importantly, as will be discussed in Part V, both the practitioners 
of the New Haven School and Robert Cover open up conceptual space that is 
foreclosed by realist and positivist visions of international law. And though 
Cover’s pluralism is obviously more open-ended than the more pragmatic 
policy orientation of McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, et al., the important 
points for the current generation of international law theorists are that we need 
to think of international law as a global interplay of plural voices, many of 
which are not associated with the state, and that we need to focus on how 
norms articulated by a wide variety of communities end up having important 
impact in actual practice, regardless of the degree of coercive power those 
communities wield. These important conceptual legacies form the foundation 
of the pluralist account of international law that is, increasingly, the core 
                                                                                                                                                                         
39. Id. at 181. 
40. See Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 6.  
41. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 6, at 58. 
42. See Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 11. 
43. See id. 
44. Id.  
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perspective of the “new” New Haven School of International Law that has 
emerged over the past decade. 
III. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: A BLENDING OF PROCESS AND 
PLURALISM 
If there is a “new” New Haven School, then its roots spring in part from 
Harold Koh’s melding of the original New Haven School with the legal 
pluralism of Robert Cover. Unfortunately, those who study international 
public and private law have not, historically, paid much attention to Robert 
Cover’s work or to the scholars of legal pluralism more generally.45 This is 
because the emphasis traditionally has been on state-to-state relations. Indeed, 
international law has generally emphasized bilateral and multilateral treaties 
between and among states, the activities of the United Nations, the 
pronouncements of international tribunals, and (somewhat more 
controversially) the norms that states have obeyed for long enough that such 
norms could be deemed customary.46 This was a legal universe with two 
guiding principles. First, law was deemed to reside only in the acts of official, 
state-sanctioned entities. Second, law was seen as an exclusive function of 
state sovereignty.47 
Both principles, however, have eroded over time. The rise of 
international human rights in the post-World War II era transformed 
individuals into international law stakeholders, possessing their own 
entitlements against the state.48 But even apart from individual empowerment, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
45. There are some exceptions. See, e.g., William D. Burke-White, International Legal 
Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling 
Durability of Gentili’s Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 713 (1998).  
46. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (stating that the primary sources of international law are international treaties and 
conventions, customary practices of states accepted as law, and general principles of law common to 
most legal systems). 
47. Of course, this is an over-simplified vision of international law. Obviously, non-state 
sources—including the idea of natural law itself—have long played a key role in the development of 
international legal principles. See generally David J. Bederman, Religion and the Sources of 
International Law in Antiquity, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991) (tracing the role of religion in the Near East during 
the empires of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Hittites, Mittani, Israelites, Greek city-states, Indian states 
before 150 B.C., and Mediterranean powers before 168 B.C.). Indeed, prior to Jeremy Bentham, these 
non-state sources, including the universal common law of jus gentium, were arguably far more important 
than the norms generated by states. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 9, at 
2605 (noting that medieval legal scholars viewed the law of nations, understood as jus naturae et 
gentium, as a universal law binding upon all mankind). In the nineteenth century, though positivism 
reigned both in the United States and abroad, transnational non-state actors nevertheless played 
important roles. See id. at 2612 (noting the work of William Wilberforce and the British and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society; Henry Dunant and the International Committee of the Red Cross; and Christian 
peace activists, such as America’s William Ladd and Elihu Burritt, who promoted public international 
arbitration and permanent international criminal courts). And, of course, natural law principles continue 
to undergird many international law doctrines, such as jus cogens norms. See MARK JANIS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2003). 
48. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 31, 33 (1996) (“At mid-century, the international system began a slow, hesitant move from state 
values towards human values.”); W. Michael Reisman, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, at xi, xii (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999) (noting that “since the Second World War, an increasing 
number of international norms of both customary and conventional provenance . . . now restrict or 
310 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 32: 301 
 
scholars have come to recognize the myriad ways in which the prerogatives of 
nation-states are cabined by transnational and international actors. Thus, we 
have seen increasing attention to the important—though sometimes 
inchoate—processes of international norm development. Such processes 
inevitably lead scholars to consider non-state norms, including norms 
articulated by international bodies, NGOs, multinational corporations and 
industry groups, indigenous communities, transnational terrorists, networks of 
activists, and so on. 
The scholars of the New Haven School, by focusing on the social 
processes of international and transnational politics, helped usher in this less 
power-based, less formalist account of international legal mechanisms. Koh’s 
subsequent study of transnational legal process kept the emphasis on 
processes of norm articulation and decisionmaking, but wedded this process-
based analysis to a Cover-like embrace of the potentially jurisgenerative 
power of international and transnational legal norms. Cover had defined 
jurisgenerative processes as those in which interpretive “communities do 
create law and do give meaning to law through their narratives and 
precepts.” 49  Koh invoked this jurisgenerative role of international and 
transnational law in multiple articles. First, in a 1994 lecture, Koh argued that 
the interaction among multiple transnational actors was  
what Robert Cover calls “jurisgenerative.” It not only generated law—the domestic 
private law of letters of credit, the domestic public law of executive power, the 
international private law of dispute-resolution, and the public international law of 
diplomatic relations law—but generated new interpretations of those rules and 
internalized them into domestic law that now guides and channels those actors’ future 
conduct.50 
Subsequently, in a 1997 essay on why nations obey international law, Koh 
again invoked Cover to explain how an “epistemic community” was formed 
around a specific interpretation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the 
ways in which this community successfully pushed the internalization of its 
preferred interpretation into U.S. governmental policy.51 Finally, in a 1998 
lecture on domestic internalization of international law, Koh once more 
invoked the jurisgenerative power of international law, arguing that “[i]f 
nations regularly participate in transnational legal interactions in a particular 
issue area, even resisting nations cannot insulate themselves forever from 
complying with the particular rules of international law that govern that 
area.”52 
Koh’s repeated references to Cover are significant. Indeed, the entire 
idea of transnational legal process that Koh has championed can be seen as a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
displace specific law-making and applying competences of states”). But see JANIS, supra note 47, at 177 
(noting that even after Nuremberg, international law derived primarily from state practice); GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-36 (1957) (same).  
49. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 6, at 40. 
50. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 9, at 186 (footnote omitted). 
51. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 9, at 2648 (quoting Peter 
Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 
(1992) (book review). 
52. Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 641-42 
(1998).  
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canny effort to combine the process and policy orientation of McDougal, 
Lasswell, Reisman, et al., with Cover’s emphasis on multiple norm-generating 
communities and the impact of law on consciousness. From this intellectual 
amalgam, transnational legal process emerged as a way to explain the impact 
of international law even when it was not backed by obvious coercive power. 
IV. A PLURALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: SIX SITES OF STUDY 
Building further on Koh’s approach requires delving deeper into Cover’s 
legal pluralism and taking its insights even more firmly to heart. While Koh’s 
transnational legal process framework ushered in what has arguably become a 
“new” New Haven School perspective on international law, that framework is 
now being expanded in significant ways, reflecting an ever-deepening 
pluralist orientation. This Part briefly describes some of the sites of study for a 
pluralist approach to international law. This new scholarship, I have argued 
elsewhere, begins to turn the focus of inquiry from “international law”—
traditionally conceived as state-to-state interactions—to “law and 
globalization,” a more multivalent study.53 
A. The Multidirectional Interaction of Local, National, and 
International Norms 
Both international law triumphalists and international law critics tend to 
share in common a top-down vision of international law. From this 
perspective, international norms are imposed on nation-states or local actors, 
and the challenge (or the fear) is the degree to which various populations 
imbibe the international norm. Even the transnational legal process paradigm, 
though it acknowledges an important role for non-state norm entrepreneurs, 
tends to focus ultimately on the ways in which state actors internalize 
international norms, thereby emphasizing a more top-down model. 
This top-down conception, however, captures only part of the picture of 
how law operates globally. After all, nation-state bureaucracies may imbibe 
institutional roles from each other. Moreover, the “international community” 
is not a monolithic entity, but a collection of interests. Similarly, “local” 
norms are always contested, even within their communities, and “local” actors 
may well invoke “non-local” norms for strategic or political advantage. In 
addition, local actors deploying or resisting national or international norms 
may well subvert or transform them, and the resulting transformation is sure 
to seep back “up” so that, over time, the “international” norm is transformed 
as well.  
Thus, the local, the national, and the international are all constantly 
shifting concepts. Accordingly, scholars of law and globalization must study 
the back and forth of the feedback loops: How do local actors access the 
power of NGOs? How are governmental and foundation funding decisions 
made, and how do funding priorities affect the projects undertaken around the 
world? How are global norms deployed locally? Do local concerns get 
                                                                                                                                                                         
53. See Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, supra note 16. 
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strategically transformed by elected elites at the national level? How do U.N. 
bureaucracies foster the creation of a cadre of “local” actors who are more 
aligned with other U.N. officials than with those in their “home” countries? 
What role do Western universities play in the creation of national and local 
norms given that many “local” elites are educated abroad? Only through a 
more fine-grained, nuanced understanding of the way legal norms are passed 
on from one group to the other and then transformed before spreading back 
again can law and globalization scholars begin to approach the multifaceted 
ways in which legal norms develop. 
B. Non-state International Lawmaking 
A more pluralist account of international law also recognizes the wide 
variety of non-state actors engaged in the establishment of norms that operate 
internationally and transnationally. Thus, “not all the phenomena related to 
law and not all that are law-like have their source in the government.”54 
Indeed, prior to the rise of the state system, much lawmaking took place in 
autonomous institutions and within smaller units such as cities and guilds, 
while large geographic areas were left largely unregulated.55 Even in modern 
nation-states, we see a whole range of non-state lawmaking in tribal or ethnic 
enclaves, 56  religious organizations, 57  corporate bylaws, social customs, 58 
private regulatory bodies, and a wide variety of groups, associations, and non-
state institutions.59 For example, in England bodies such as the church, the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
54. Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 15 
(Leon Lipson & S. Wheeler eds., 1986). See also Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking 
Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992) (“[L]egal pluralism is at the same time both: social 
norms and legal rules, law and society, formal and informal, rule-oriented and spontaneous.”). But see 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J. L. & SOC’Y 
192, 193 (1993) (arguing that such a broad view of “law” causes law to lose any distinctive meaning).  
55. See EHRLICH, supra note 27, at 14-38 (analyzing and describing the differences between 
legal and non-legal norms). See generally OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND 
EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES (George Heiman ed. & trans., 1977) (setting forth a legal philosophy based 
on the concept of association as a fundamental human organizing principle); OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL 
LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest Barker trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1934) 
(1913) (presenting a theory of the evolution of the state and non-state groups according to the principle 
of natural law). 
56. See, e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The 
Case of the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993) (delineating the subtle interactions between the legal 
system of the Romani people and the norms of their host countries). 
57. See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980) (examining the 
contractual underpinnings of four nineteenth-century American religious utopian communities: the 
Shakers, the Harmony Society, Oneida, and Zoar). As Marc Galanter has observed, the field of church 
and state is the “locus classicus of thinking about the multiplicity of normative orders.” Galanter, supra 
note 4, at 28. See also Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and 
Religious Authority, KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY 228-56 (Diana 
Tietjens Meyers, Kenneth Kipriis & Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr. eds., Cornell Univ. Press 1993) (1988) 
(analyzing church-state relations in the United States from a pluralist perspective). 
58. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 43-49 (1968) (describing “implicit law,” 
which includes everything from rules governing a camping trip among friends to the customs of 
merchants). 
59. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (drawing on an empirical study of relations among cattle ranchers to develop a theory 
of non-legal norms as a source of social control); Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An 
Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 1545 (1989) (surveying the sources of popular perceptions of the law); 
Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and 
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stock exchange, the legal profession, the insurance market, and even the 
Jockey Club opted for forms of self-regulation that included machinery for 
arbitrating disputes among their own members.60 Moreover, “private, closely 
knit, homogenous micro-societies can create their own norms that at times 
trump state law and at other times fill lacunae in state regulation but 
nonetheless operate autonomously.”61 Thus, as Janet Koven Levit has noted in 
the context of transnational trade finance, rules embodied in various informal 
standards, procedures, and agreements that bind banks and credit agencies 
have the force of law even without any official governmental involvement.62 
In addition, she points out that more formal lawmaking institutions such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) have, over time, appropriated these norms 
into their official legal instruments.63 
In some circumstances, official legal actors may delegate lawmaking 
authority to non-state entities or recognize the efficacy of non-state norms. For 
example, commercial litigation, particularly in the international arena, 
increasingly takes place before non-state arbitral panels. 64  Likewise, 
nongovernmental standard-setting bodies, from Underwriters Laboratories 
(which tests electrical and other equipment) to the Motion Picture Association 
of America (which rates the content of films) to the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (which administers the Internet domain name 
system), construct detailed normative systems with the effect of law. 
Regulation of much financial market activity is left to private authorities such 
as stock markets or trade associations like the National Association of 
Securities Dealers. These international trade association groups and their 
private standard-setting bodies wield a tremendous influence in creating 
voluntary standards that become industry norms.65 For example, in the wake 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 185 (1987) (discussing the concept of legality as reflected in 
popular culture); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (presenting empirical data on non-legal dispute settlement in the 
manufacturing industry).  
60. See F.W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 189-95 
(H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) (1904) (describing the sophisticated non-legal means of enforcing 
order among members of these institutions). 
61. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of 
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005). See also, e.g., Amitai Aviram, A 
Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
1 (2004) (using game theory to argue that the existence of pre-existing networks enhances a private legal 
system’s ability to enforce norms); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 J. LEG. STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the system of “private lawmaking” in the New York Diamond 
Dealers Club). 
62. See Levit, supra note 61. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 5-9 (1996) 
(noting the “tremendous growth” in international commercial arbitration over the past twenty-five to 
thirty years). 
65. For example, the Fair Labor Association (formerly the Apparel Industry Partnership) has 
created the standards now accepted as the norm in the apparel industry. See Fair Labor Association, 
Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring, http://www.fairlabor.org/all/code (providing 
a set of standards defining decent and humane working conditions) (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
Likewise, in the chemical industry, groups such as the Canadian Chemical Manufacturers Association 
and the International Counsel of Chemical Associations (ICCA) have set industry standards in 
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of the scandal surrounding Enron Corporation, the governmental reforms 
incorporated into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200266  received most of the 
attention, but changes involving the way corporate debt is rated by Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s (both private corporations) may be even more 
significant over the long term.67 Likewise, while international labor standards 
are difficult to establish at the governmental level, several private companies 
in the apparel industry, responding to calls for global responsibility and the 
setting of norms, have adopted codes of conduct and participated in the United 
Nations’ Global Compact.68 
The proliferation of international tribunals also, of course, creates the 
opportunity for plural norm creation. Thus, commentators have noted the 
increasing role of WTO appellate tribunals in creating an international 
common law of trade,69 as well as the new prominence of other specialized 
trade courts developed in connection with free trade agreements.70 Moreover, 
though only state parties can be formal litigants in the WTO dispute resolution 
process, free trade panels permit private parties to challenge domestic 
governmental regulations directly.71  In addition, a number of international 
conventions, though signed by state parties, empower private actors to 
develop international norms. For example, the Convention on the Settlement 
                                                                                                                                                                         
conjunction with other NGOs and environmental organizations such as Greenpeace. See Lee A. Tavis, 
Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 508-09 (2002) 
(“This [standard setting] reflects a complicated inter-relationship among the members of a private sector 
regime (ICCA), and other non-governmental organisations (Greenpeace), and governmental institutions 
(IFCS) and individual governments.”) (quoting Virginia Hanfler, Private Sector International Regimes, 
in NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 121, 129 (Richard A. Higgott et al. 
eds., 2000)).  
66. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). 
67. See Jenny Wiggins, Enron—Wall Street and Regulators: S&P Outlines Ratings Overhaul 
in Light of Enron, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, available at http://specials.ft.com/enron/ 
FT3DYSSOWWC.html (discussing changes in U.S. corporate governance and debt rating in the post-
Enron world). See also Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 236 (2003) (“Institutional Shareholder Services, Governance 
Metrics International, Standard & Poor’s, and others have started grading the corporate governance 
structures of companies, just as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s grade their debt.”). 
68. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards: The Potential of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 208 (2004) (noting this phenomenon but 
discussing difficulties in holding private corporations to such codes). 
69. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part 
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief, there is a body of international 
common law of trade emerging as a result of adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body. We have yet 
to recognize, much less account for, this reality in our doctrinal thinking and discussions.”). 
70. See, e.g., Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade 
Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT’L LAW. 707 (1993) (describing the emergence of a binational panel 
process stemming from Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). 
71. For example, under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, private investors have standing to challenge a 
NAFTA government’s regulatory decisions. See Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western 
Hemisphere: Expanding the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation into the 
Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 507 (2003) (“NAFTA’s Chapter 11 establishes rules pertaining to 
investments and investors, including a dispute settlement mechanism allowing private investors to 
challenge NAFTA governments directly for breach of the investment provisions of Chapter 11.”). For an 
argument that non-governmental organizations (including business groups) should be granted formal 
WTO standing, see, for example, Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in 
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (1996); and G. Richard Shell, Trade 
Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 829, 907-22 (1995). 
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of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States permits 
private creditors to sue debtor states in an international forum.72 Similarly, the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods allows transacting parties to 
opt out of any nation-state law and instead choose a sort of “merchant law” 
reminiscent of the feudal era’s lex mercatoria.73 
Accordingly, a more comprehensive conception of the global legal order 
must attend to the jurisdictional assertions and articulations of legal (or quasi-
legal) norms by non-sovereign communities. Such jurisdictional assertions are 
significant because, though they often lack state-backed coercive power, they 
may in fact carry real coercive force, and even when they do not have any 
coercive force at all, they may open a space for the articulation of legal norms 
that are often subsequently incorporated into official legal regimes. Indeed, 
once we recognize that the state does not hold a monopoly on the articulation 
and exercise of legal norms, we can see law as a locus for various 
communities to debate different visions of alternative futures. 
C. Dialectical Legal Interactions  
Some who study international law fail to find real “law” there because 
they are looking for hierarchically-based commands backed by coercive 
power. In contrast, a pluralist approach understands that interactions between 
various tribunals and regulatory authorities are more likely to take on a 
dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review traditionally 
undertaken by appellate courts, nor simply the dialogue that often occurs 
under the doctrine of comity.74 In the international context, for example, we 
may see treaty-based courts exert an important influence even as national 
courts retain formal independence, much as U.S. federal courts exercising 
habeas corpus jurisdiction may well influence state court interpretations of 
U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases.75 In turn, the decisions of national 
courts may also come to influence international tribunals. This dialectical 
                                                                                                                                                                         
72. See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331 (1972), reprinted in ARON BROCHES, 
SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 188, 198 (1995) (observing that the Convention “firmly establishes the capacity of 
a private individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a State in an international forum, thus 
contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as a subject of international law”); IGNAZ 
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, COLLECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 374 (1998) (noting that the “Convention attempts to encourage foreign investors to 
invest in developing countries by granting to them, in case of a dispute with the host country, a status 
equal to that enjoyed by that State”). See generally G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and 
Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 703, 
715 (2004) (discussing private party participation in dispute settlements before the ICSID and the 
International Labor Organization). 
73. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design 
and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 159 (2004) (noting that the 
Convention “explicitly incorporates trade usages into contracts that it governs, permits usages to trump 
conflicting [Convention] provisions, and authorizes courts to interpret and complete contracts by 
reference to usages”). But see Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria—Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 
5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 67 (2004) (arguing that the modern revival of lex mercatoria departs significantly from 
the historical conception). 
74. For a detailed analysis of such dialectical regulation, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Between 
Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004). 
75. See id. at 2034. 
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relationship, if it emerges, will exist without an official hierarchical 
relationship based on coercive power. For example, a North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) panel recently determined that a particular 
Mississippi state appellate procedure violated international norms of due 
process and constituted an unfair trade practice.76 In a subsequent Mississippi 
case concerning the same procedure, the state court will therefore face a form 
of choice-of-law decision, with the state court determining what weight to 
give the NAFTA tribunal action. And, of course, court-to-court dialectical 
regulation is only the tip of the iceberg, as various transnational and inter-
systemic regulation takes on a similar dialectical dynamic.77 
D. Conflicts of Law  
More than ten years ago, German theorist Gunther Teubner called for 
the creation of an “inter-systemic conflicts law,” derived not just from 
collisions between the distinct nations of private international law, but from 
what he described as “collisions between distinct global social sectors.”78 
Since then, the web of inter-systemic lawmaking Teubner described has only 
grown more complex. In a world of extraterritorial and non-territorial effects, 
we will see local populations increasingly attempt to assert dominion (or, in 
legal terms, jurisdiction) over territorially distant acts or actors. At the same 
time, we will see non-local actors invoke the jurisdiction of international or 
transnational tribunals in order to avoid the consequences of local legal 
proceedings. In both circumstances, battles over globalization will often be 
fought on the terrain of conflict of laws. 
For example, online communication creates the possibility (and perhaps 
even the likelihood) that content posted online by a person in one physical 
location will violate the law in some other physical location. This poses an 
inevitable problem of extraterritoriality. Will the person who posts the content 
be required to conform her activities to the norms of the most restrictive 
community of readers? Or, alternatively, will the restrictive community of 
readers, which has adopted a norm regarding Internet content, be subjected to 
the proscribed material regardless of its wishes? The answers to these 
questions depend both on whether the community of readers asserts the 
jurisdictional authority to impose its norms on the foreign content provider 
and whether the home country of the content provider chooses to recognize 
the norms imposed. 
Thus, in the celebrated case involving France’s efforts to prosecute 
Yahoo! for allowing French citizens to download Nazi memorabilia and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
76. Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, para. 119 (2003), 
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf. 
77. For a more detailed discussion of intersystemic regulation, see Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006). 
78. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100 (Zenon Bankowski ed., Anne 
Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993); see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime 
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
999, 1000 (2004) (making a similar claim). 
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Holocaust denial material,79  there was little doubt that it could take such 
actions with regard to Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!’s French subsidiary. 80  However, 
Yahoo! argued that the French assertion of jurisdiction over the U.S.-based 
Yahoo.com was improper in its scope.81 According to Yahoo!, in order to 
comply with the injunction it would need to remove the pages from its servers 
altogether (not just for the French audience), thereby denying such material to 
non-French citizens, many of whom have the right to access the materials 
under the laws of their countries.82 Most importantly, Yahoo! argued that such 
extraterritorial censoring of American web content would run afoul of the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 83  Thus, Yahoo! and others 84 
contended that the French assertion of jurisdiction was an impermissible 
attempt by France to impose global rules for Internet expression.85 
Yet the extraterritoriality charge runs in both directions. If France is not 
able to block the access of French citizens to proscribed material, then the 
United States will effectively be imposing First Amendment norms on the 
entire world. Indeed, we should not be surprised that as the Internet itself 
becomes less U.S.-centered, a variety of content norms will begin competing 
for primacy. 86  And though geographical tracking software might seem to 
solve the problem by allowing websites to offer different content to different 
users, such a solution is probably illusory, because it would still require the 
sites to analyze the laws of all jurisdictions to determine what material to filter 
for which users.87 Cross-border environmental88 and trade regulation89 raise 
similar issues. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
79. L’Association Union des Etudiants Juifs de France [UEJF] [Unified Jewish Student Union 
Association of France] v. Yahoo!, Inc., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, Ordonnance de référé [order for summary judgment], Nos. 00/05308, 
00/05309, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm. 
80. Similarly, Google.com has succumbed to pressure from the Chinese government to 
maintain a censored version of its Web site in China. See Google Censors Itself for China, BBC NEWS, 
Jan. 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4645596.stm. 
81. See UEJF v. Yahoo!, Inc., T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ordonnance de référé (Order for 
Summary Judgment), No. 00/05308, at 3, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis 
20001120.pdf.  
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Experts See Online Speech Case as Bellwether, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
5, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/05/technology/05CYBERLAW.html?pagewanted=all 
(quoting the warning of Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, that 
if “litigants and governments in other countries . . . go after American service providers . . . we could 
easily wind up with a lowest common denominator standard for protected speech on the Net”). 
85. As Greg Wrenn, associate general counsel for Yahoo!’s international division, put it: “We 
are not going to acquiesce in the notion that foreign countries have unlimited jurisdiction to regulate the 
content of U.S.-based sites.” Id. 
86. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261 
(2002) (arguing that the French Yahoo! decision signals that the Internet regulatory framework must 
recognize values adopted by different states and can no longer be dictated by primarily U.S.-based 
technical elites). 
87. Indeed, one member of an expert panel appointed by the Yahoo! court to explore the 
feasibility of geographical filtering subsequently argued that such filtering, though technically feasible, 
would impose a tremendous burden on services such as Yahoo! because such services would be required 
“to maintain a huge matrix of pages versus jurisdictions to see who can and can’t see what.” Ben Laurie, 
An Expert’s Apology (Nov. 21, 2000), http://www.apache-ssl.org/apology.html.  
88. See, e.g., TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006); Philippe Sands, Turtles 
and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 536 (2000). 
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Just as local communities affected by distant corporate activity may seek 
to assert jurisdiction over those allegedly causing the harm, corporations may 
seek to avoid local jurisdiction by invoking the competing jurisdiction of 
international tribunals. For example, as noted previously, under NAFTA and 
other similar agreements, special panels can pass judgment on the due process 
provided in local legal proceedings.90 And though the panels cannot directly 
review or overturn local judgments, they can levy fines against the federal 
government signatories of the agreement,91 thereby undermining the impact of 
the local judgment. Meanwhile, in the realm of human rights, we have seen 
criminal defendants convicted in state courts in the United States proceed 
(through their governments) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to 
argue that they were denied the right to contact their consulate, as required by 
treaty.92 Again, although the ICJ judgments are technically unenforceable in 
the United States, at least one state court followed the ICJ’s command 
anyway.93 
In each of these cases, we see a dialectical dance created by the fact that 
multiple communities are asserting jurisdiction over the same activities. Such 
dances are likely to become the norm, as a variety of communities claim an 
interest in regulating distant behavior having extraterritorial effects (as in 
Yahoo!), or as parties claim a community affiliation beyond the local (as in the 
trade and human rights examples). Thus, there is an increasing global 
instantiation of the jurisdictional redundancy Cover celebrated in the domestic 
realm.94 
All of these extraterritorial jurisdictional assertions inevitably increase 
the pressure on choice-of-law doctrines as well. For example, Anupam 
Chander has observed that many members of the Indian-American diaspora 
purchase bonds issued by their home country of India.95 The purchase of these 
bonds obviously reflects the ongoing tie these members of the Indian diaspora 
feel for their “homeland.” Thus, one might argue that, even when the bonds 
are purchased in the United States, the purchases should be governed by 
Indian, rather than U.S., securities laws because the bond sale reflects a 
substantive (and voluntary) tie between the purchasers and the Indian 
government. Likewise, multinational copyright disputes could be adjudicated 
through the application of hybrid legal norms drawn from a variety of relevant 
countries.96 
                                                                                                                                                                         
89. See, e.g., Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global 
Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(1999). 
90. See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1135, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (outlining remedies available under 
Chapter 11). 
91. Id. 
92. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 581 (Mar. 31). 
93. Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (order granting stay of 
execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing). 
94. See Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 11. 
95. See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005 (2001). 
96. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should 
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000) (advocating this approach). 
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Meanwhile, a fluidly plural system makes it more likely that authorities 
in one territorial location will be asked to enforce a judgment issued 
elsewhere. The criteria for making such an enforcement decision are uncertain 
and likely to change over time. Within the United States, the Constitution’s 
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that a valid judgment issued by one state 
be enforced by every other state even if the judgment being enforced would be 
illegal if issued by the rendering state. 97  But of course, within a single, 
relatively homogenous country, the idea of one state enforcing another state’s 
judgment does not seem so significant because the variations from state to 
state are likely to be relatively minor. In contrast, transnational recognition of 
judgments will be more controversial. 
Yet, while the decision to enforce a judgment surely will be less 
automatic when the judgment at issue was rendered by a foreign (or 
international) tribunal, many of the same principles are still relevant. Thus, 
courts could acknowledge the importance of participating in an interlocking 
international legal system, where litigants cannot simply avoid unpleasant 
judgments by relocating. Moreover, deference to other lawmaking bodies will 
have long-term reciprocal benefits. Particularly when the parties have no 
significant affiliation with the enforcing community, there is little reason for a 
court to insist on following domestic public policies in the face of such 
competing “conflicts values” and therefore deny enforcement. And though the 
doctrine of comity has long been used to capture these values,98 thinking of 
the issue as a matter of judgment recognition (instead of comity) may 
discourage courts from reflexively invoking public policy to avoid unpopular 
foreign judgments. 
In any event, it is clear that, in a world of plural normative assertions, 
one crucial question will be whether a community’s articulation of norms is 
sufficiently persuasive to convince those wielding coercive power to enforce 
such norms. For example, if a community purports to adjudicate a dispute, its 
judgment is not necessarily self-executing, particularly if the losing party is 
territorially distant. Thus, some entity with police power must enforce the 
judgment. Accordingly, the question becomes not whether a community can 
assert jurisdiction, but whether other communities are willing to give 
deference to the judgment rendered and enforce it as if it were their own. 
Indeed, as Cover himself acknowledged, even at the moment that a 
community daringly asserts its own legal jurisdiction, it is immediately forced 
to acknowledge that its invention is limited by the willingness of others to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
97. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause “ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, 
because the practical operation of the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it”); 
see also Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (“In numerous cases this 
Court has held that credit must be given to the judgment of another state although the forum would not 
be required to entertain the suit on which the judgment was founded. . . .”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 
230, 237 (1908) (stating that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit in 
Mississippi even if the Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). 
98. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (“[Comity] is the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having 
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”). 
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accept the judgment as normatively legitimate.99 Such jurisdictional politics 
form an inevitable part of a global system less defined by Westphalian 
delineations of authority based on clear territorial boundaries. 
E. Procedural Mechanisms for Managing Hybrid Legal Spaces  
These spheres of complex overlapping legal authority are, not 
surprisingly, sites of conflict and confusion. In response to this hybrid reality, 
communities might seek to “solve” such conflicts either by imposing the 
primacy of territorially-based sovereign state authority or by seeking universal 
harmonization. Thus, on the one hand, communities may try to seal 
themselves off from outside influence by retreating from the rest of the world 
and becoming more insular (as some religious groups seek to do100); by 
building walls, both literal101 or regulatory,102 to protect the community from 
outsiders; by taking measures to limit outside influence (proposed U.S. 
legislation seeking to discipline judges for citing foreign or international law 
is but one prominent example 103 ); or by imposing territorially-based 
jurisdictional or choice-of-law rules.104 At the other extreme, we see calls for 
harmonization of norms,105 more treaties,106 the construction of international 
governing bodies,107 and the creation of “world law.”108  
                                                                                                                                                                         
99. As Cover points out, though law is a bridge to an alternative set of norms, the bridge 
begins not in “alternity” but in reality. Therefore there are real constraints on the engineering of that 
bridge. See Cover, Folktales of Justice, supra note 6, at 191 (“If law . . . is a bridge from reality to a new 
world there must be some constraints on its engineering. Judges must dare, but what happens when they 
lose that reality?”). 
100. See, e.g., WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA, supra note 57 (discussing such 
communities).  
101. See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367 (2006) (authorizing the creation 
of a 700-mile-long 15-foot-high fence along the U.S.-Mexico border); Gwynne Dyer, World Full of 
Mined and Monitored Walls, GUELPH MERCURY (Guelph, Ont., Can.), Feb. 10, 2007, at A11, available 
at 2007 WLNR 2679139 (discussing border fences being built in Israel, Thailand, India, Pakistan, 
Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia).  
102. See, e.g., Ben Elgin & Bruce Einhorn, The Great Firewall of China, BUSINESSWEEK 
ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2006/tc20060112_ 
434051.htm (describing China’s efforts to control internet content entering the country). 
103. See, e.g., Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108th 
Cong. (2004).  
104. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan 
Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105 (2005) (criticizing a territorialist approach). 
105. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among Trading 
Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 9, 32-34 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 
1996) (outlining how concerns about a regulatory “race-to-the-bottom” lead to calls for international 
harmonization of regulatory standards). 
106. See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case 
for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883 (2005) (calling for international 
harmonization of online consumer protection laws). 
107. See, e.g., Posting of Circle ID Reporter to http://www.circleid.com/posts/ 
interview_with_united_nations_head_secretariat_of_wgig (July 30, 2004) (interviewing Markus 
Kummer, Head Secretariat of the U.N. Working Group on Internet Governance, and quoting him as 
saying that a “United Nations umbrella would be a prerequisite to give the necessary political legitimacy 
to Internet governance”). 
108. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1617-22 (1995); Harold 
J. Berman, World Law: An Ecumenical Jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit, Emory Public Law Research 
Paper No. 05-4, at 5, http://ssrn.com/abstract=666143 (Feb. 2005) (“[I]t is obvious that there cannot be a 
world community without a body of world law to maintain both order and justice among its different 
constituents.”). 
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However, both sovereigntist territorialization and universalism may 
sometimes be normatively unattractive options and are, in any event, doomed 
to succeed only partially, if at all. However, these are not the only two 
strategies available for responding to hybridity. In addition, following the 
insights of legal pluralism, we need to understand that normative conflict 
among multiple, overlapping legal systems is often unavoidable and might 
even sometimes be desirable both as a source of innovation and as a site for 
discourse among multiple community affiliations. Thus, instead of trying to 
stifle legal conflict either through a reimposition of territorialist prerogative or 
through universalist harmonization schemes, communities might seek (and 
increasingly are creating) a wide variety of procedural mechanisms and 
institutions for managing, without eliminating, hybridity. Such mechanisms 
and institutions may help mediate conflicts by recognizing that multiple 
communities may legitimately wish to assert their norms over a given act or 
actor, by seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and by deferring to 
other approaches, if possible. Moreover, when deference is impossible 
(because some instances of legal pluralism are repressive, violent, and/or 
profoundly illiberal109), procedures for managing hybridity can at least require 
an explanation of why the decisionmaker refuses to defer.  
Although I leave to another day a more detailed discussion of the many 
such procedural mechanisms and institutions for managing hybridity currently 
in place,110 the crucial antecedent point is that, although people may never 
reach agreement on norms, they may at least acquiesce in procedures that take 
pluralism seriously, rather than ignoring it through assertions of territorially-
based power or dissolving it through universalist imperatives. Processes for 
managing hybridity seek to preserve the spaces of opportunity for contestation 
and local variation that legal pluralists have long documented, and therefore a 
focus on hybridity may be both normatively preferable and more practical 
precisely because agreement on substantive norms is so difficult.  
F. The Disaggregation of the State  
One of the reasons that it is so important to conceive of law beyond the 
state is that the state itself is increasingly delegating power to private actors 
who exist in a shadowy world of quasi-public/quasi-private authority. The 
issue of private parties exercising forms of governmentally authorized power 
has long been a subject of U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence and 
scholarship, but international law scholars are only just beginning to consider 
such issues. Thus, for example, P.W. Singer notes that many military 
activities—including combat, surveillance, training, and interrogation 
functions—are increasingly being contracted out to private companies.111 Yet, 
both domestic and international accountability mechanisms have historically 
                                                                                                                                                                         
109. See, e.g., SANTOS, supra note 4, at 89 (“To my mind there is nothing inherently good, 
progressive, or emancipatory about ‘legal pluralism’. Indeed, there are instances of legal pluralism that 
are quite reactionary. Suffice it to mention here the . . . legal orders established by armed groups—e.g., 
paramilitary forces in connivance with repressive states—in the territories under their control.”). 
110. See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 4. 
111. See P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004). 
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been premised on such roles being played by governmental actors. And the 
literature on privatization in the domestic context often focuses on the U.S. 
constitutional doctrines of “state action” or non-delegation of congressional 
authority to administrative agencies.112 Neither of these analytical frameworks 
is precisely applicable to the international context.113  Likewise, studies of 
transnational regulatory networks, inter-systemic regulation, and the role of 
NGOs and industry standards in shaping norms reflect the growing 
disaggregation of state-based governance models. Thus, over the coming 
decade, a pluralist approach to international law undoubtedly will explore the 
many ramifications of this new trend in governance. 
 
****** 
 
Obviously this quick survey does not even begin to exhaust the range of 
inquiries opened up, or illuminated, by a pluralist approach to international 
law. But perhaps most fundamentally, no matter what the particular object of 
study may be, a pluralist account encourages a more micro-empirical analysis 
of how transnational, international, and non-state norms are articulated, 
deployed, changed, and resisted in thousands of different local settings. Such 
studies focus on the extent to which such norms have real impact on the 
ground. Therefore, a pluralist approach provides an important alternative to 
rational choice models of law’s impact. It is to this jurisgenerative vision of 
the global plural order that this Article now turns. 
V. GLOBAL LEGAL PROCESSES AS JURISGENERATIVE 
A pluralist approach to the global legal system invites consideration of 
the “jurisgenerative,” or law-creating, role that such norms can play. Cover 
described a “jurisgenerative process” as one in which interpretive 
communities “create law and . . . give meaning to law through their narratives 
and precepts.” 114  Cover was thinking of small, closely-knit communities 
operating in insular, usually religiously-based units.115 A pluralist approach to 
international law expands the vision of jurisgenerative norms to a variety of 
transnational, subnational, or epistemic “communities.” As noted previously, 
Koh drew on this idea of jurisgenerativity in his analysis of transnational legal 
process. A pluralist approach to international law goes even further and builds 
the idea of law-creation through articulation of norms into the very fabric of 
analysis. Such an expanded conception of jurisgenerative processes 
contributes to international law scholarship in at least two important ways. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
112. For some recent examples of this literature, see Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law 
Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: 
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003).  
113. For a detailed analysis of privatization in the international context, see LAURA A. 
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE (forthcoming 2007). 
114. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 6, at 40. 
115. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1602 n.2 (1986) (arguing 
that legal interpretation or “the creation of legal meaning is an essentially cultural activity which takes 
place (or best takes place) among smallish groups”). 
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First, it extricates international law scholars from fruitless debates about 
whether international law is really law at all, or which legal rules should be 
deemed “legitimate.” As we have seen, legal pluralism provides international 
law scholars with a more comprehensive framework for conceptualizing the 
clash of normative communities in the modern world. This framework frees 
scholars from needing to differentiate so much between “law” and “non-law” 
or “legitimate” and “illegitimate” jurisdictional assertions. Such 
differentiations are less consequential in a pluralism context because the 
relevant question is the normative commitments of communities, not the 
formal status of those commitments. If, after all, a statement of norms is 
slowly internalized by a population, that statement will have important 
binding force, often even more so than a formal law backed by state 
sanction.116 Accordingly, by taking pluralism seriously we will more easily 
see the way in which the contest over norms creates legitimacy over time, and 
we can put to rest the idea that norms not associated with nation-states have 
no binding authority.117 As a result, instead of focusing solely on who has the 
formal authority to articulate norms or the coercive power to enforce them, we 
can turn the gaze to an empirical study of which statements of authority tend 
to be treated as binding in actual practice and by whom. 
A second advantage of thinking about global legal norms as potentially 
jurisgenerative is that such thinking generates useful responses to rational 
choice arguments that focus solely on the interests of nation-states. These 
rational choice models aim to support the idea that international and 
transnational legal norms have no independent valence whatsoever and are 
therefore obeyed when it is in the interests of nation-states to do so and 
ignored when it is not. 118  In this view, international norms are simply 
epiphenomena of state interest. However, such models necessarily assume 
both that state interests exist independently of the social context within which 
the interests are formed and that the state is a unitary entity with a single, 
definable set of interests. Both assumptions are challenged by a pluralist 
conception that emphasizes jurisgenerative practices. 
As to the idea of state interests, the whole point of jurisgenerativity is 
that norms can emerge that change the social context in which interests are 
developed. Thus, a policymaker’s idea of what is in the state’s interest is 
always and necessarily affected by ideas of appropriate action, and these ideas 
are likely to be shaped—even if unconsciously—by jurisgenerative processes, 
including the norms of international, transnational, and non-state legal 
assertions.119 Moreover, such government officials, especially in a democracy, 
are at least somewhat responsive to popular opinion, and such opinion is also 
                                                                                                                                                                         
116. Thus, the best definition of law may be a non-essentialist one: to define law as that which 
people treat as law. See Brian Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 
296, 313 (2000). 
117. See Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, supra note 12, at 1278 
(critiquing the work of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner in part on this ground). 
118. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12, at 13.  
119. As Andrew Moravcsik puts it: “Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state 
behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic 
calculations of governments.” Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997). 
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likely to be shaped by a variety of forces, again including the moral pull of 
international legal norms. As sociolegal scholars have long described, legal 
norms can effect changes in legal consciousness that in turn alter the 
categories of our thought, such that they help determine what we are likely to 
see as a viable policy option in the first place.120 
Accordingly, the mere assertion of jurisdiction and articulation of a 
norm (even without literal enforcement power), can have such great impact 
that it effectively alters legal consciousness over time. As Martha Finnemore 
has noted, “[s]ocially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and 
shared beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with 
understandings of what is important or valuable and what are effective and/or 
legitimate means of obtaining those valued goods.”121 Finnemore goes on to 
identify instances when an international regime without enforcement power 
nevertheless influenced nation-state decisionmaking. Thus, she writes: 
Prior to the actions of UNESCO, most states, especially less developed countries, had no 
notion that they needed or wanted a state science bureaucracy. Similarly, European heads 
of state were not particularly concerned about treatment of the war wounded until Henri 
Dunant and the International Committee of the Red Cross made it an issue. Global 
poverty alleviation, while long considered desirable in the abstract, was not considered a 
pressing responsibility of states, particularly of developed states, until the World Bank 
under Robert McNamara made it a necessary part of development.122 
And of course ideas of what is “right,” “just,” “appropriate,” and in one’s 
interest all will inevitably come to reflect internalized norms. Accordingly, the 
persuasive power of even unenforceable norms may cause states to develop 
interests they might not otherwise have, while shifting both popular opinion 
and the content of unconscious conceptions of “the way things are.” 
As to the idea that states even have single, definable sets of interests, a 
pluralist approach emphasizing jurisgenerativity focuses on the far messier 
reality of state policy formation, in which multiple bureaucrats with various 
spheres of authority, political ideologies, institutional loyalties, and interests 
advance competing agendas. Indeed, this is precisely the messy reality that 
formed the core study of the original New Haven School. Recognizing this 
cacophony of voices is important because many of these voices, when 
advocating policy positions, can use the moral authority or persuasive power 
of international, transnational, or even non-state norms for leverage. The 
existence of such norms therefore becomes a tool of empowerment for 
particular actors. These actors deploy international law arguments 
strategically, and may gain more of a foothold for their views because of 
international law. As a result, international law has a significant impact in 
domestic foreign policy debates because it may change the relative power of 
different interest groups seeking to shape that policy. And, of course, that is 
not even counting the myriad forces outside of government—NGOs, editorial 
writers, campaign contributors, political movements, and so on—that all exert 
influence on government actors and all may themselves be influenced by and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
120. For a more detailed discussion of legal consciousness scholarship and its relation to 
international law, see Berman, supra note 12, at 1280-95. 
121. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 15 (1996). 
122. Id. at 12. 
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may consciously deploy the norms of international law in order to press 
varying agendas. 
For example, although the celebrated efforts of Spanish Judge Baltasar 
Garzón to try former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet123 were not literally 
“successful” because Pinochet was never extradited to Spain,124 the attempted 
prosecution strengthened the hands of human rights advocates within Chile 
itself and provided the impetus for a movement that led to a Chilean Supreme 
Court decision stripping Pinochet of his lifetime immunity. 125  Likewise, 
Spanish efforts to prosecute members of the Argentine military have bolstered 
reformers within the Argentine government, most notably President Nestor 
Kirschner. In August 2003 Judge Garzón sought extradition from Argentina of 
dozens of Argentines for human rights abuses committed under the Argentine 
military government in the 1970s.126 In addition, Garzón successfully sought 
extradition from Mexico of one former Argentine Navy lieutenant who was 
accused of murdering hundreds of people.127 In the wake of Garzón’s actions, 
realist observers complained that such transnational prosecutions were 
illegitimate because Argentina had previously conferred amnesty on those 
who had been involved in the period of military rule and therefore any 
                                                                                                                                                                         
123. Judge Garzón issued an arrest order based on allegations of kidnappings, torture, and 
planned disappearances of Chilean citizens and citizens of other countries. Court Order, Spanish 
Request to Arrest General Pinochet (Audiencia Nacional, Oct. 16, 1998), reprinted in THE PINOCHET 
PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 57-59 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS]. On October 30, 1998, the Spanish National Court ruled 
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(“Chile’s Supreme Court stripped the former dictator Augusto Pinochet of immunity from prosecution in 
a notorious human rights case on Thursday, raising hopes of victims that he may finally face trial for 
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prosecution would infringe on Argentina’s sovereign “choice” to grant 
amnesty.128 
But the amnesty decision was not simply a unitary choice made by some 
unified “state” of Argentina; it was a politically contested act that remained 
controversial within the country.129 And the Spanish extradition request itself 
gave President Kirschner more leverage in his tug-of-war with the legal 
establishment over the amnesty laws. Just a month after Garzón’s request, 
both houses of the Argentine Congress voted by large majorities to annul the 
laws.130 Meanwhile the Spanish government decided that it would not make 
the formal extradition request to Argentina that Garzón sought, but it did so 
based primarily on the fact that Argentina had begun to scrap its amnesty laws 
and the accused would therefore be subject to domestic human rights 
prosecution.131 President Kirschner therefore could use Spain’s announcement 
to increase pressure on the Argentine Supreme Court to officially overturn the 
amnesty laws.132 
Finally, on June 14, 2005 the Argentine Supreme Court did in fact strike 
down the amnesty laws, thus clearing the way for domestic human rights 
prosecutions.133 Not only was the pressure exerted by Spain instrumental in 
these efforts, but it is significant that the Argentine Court cited as legal 
precedent a 2001 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
striking down a similar amnesty provision in Peru as incompatible with the 
American Convention on Human Rights and hence without legal effect.134 So, 
in the end, the “sovereign” state of Argentina made political and legal choices 
to repeal the amnesty laws just as it had previously made choices to create 
them. But in this change of heart we can see the degree to which international 
legal pronouncements, even if they are without any literal constraining effect, 
may significantly alter the domestic political terrain. 
Thus, a pluralist approach to international law, because it emphasizes 
jurisgenerative processes, provides a compelling alternative to top-down 
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models that focus solely on coercive power and the interests of nation-states. 
By cataloging the complex reality of multiple interests, multiple normative 
assertions, and multiple effects, we can see how norms articulated by 
international, transnational, non-state, and epistemic communities influence 
both policy decisions and categories of thought over time. Taking Cover’s 
insights into the arena of global legal processes frees scholars to conduct 
detailed empirical analyses of the inevitable conflicts of norms articulated by 
multiple communities. Such analyses will necessarily go beyond both the 
simplified models of rational choice realists and the triumphalism that can 
afflict international law proponents, who have sometimes simply assumed that 
international law affects state behavior without the essential process-based 
micro analyses. 
Of course, one thing that a pluralist approach will not do is provide an 
authoritative metric for determining which norms should prevail in this messy 
hybrid world. Nor does it answer the question of who gets to decide. Indeed, 
pluralism fundamentally challenges the positivist assumption that there can 
ever be a single answer to such questions. For example, as pluralists have 
documented in the colonial context, the state’s efforts to squelch a non-state 
community are likely only to be partial, and so the state’s assertion of its own 
trumping authority is not the end of the debate, but only one gambit in an 
ongoing normative discourse that has no final resolution. Likewise, there is no 
external position from which one could make a definitive statement as to who 
is authorized to make decisions in any given case. Rather, a statement of 
authority is itself inevitably open to contest. Power disparities matter, of 
course, and those who wield coercive force may be able to silence competing 
voices for a time. But even that sort of temporary silencing is rarely the end of 
the story either.  
Certainly individual communities may decide that their norms should 
trump those of others or that their norms are authoritative. So, for example, a 
liberal democratic state might decide that certain illiberal community practices 
are so beyond the pale that they cannot be countenanced and therefore the 
state may invoke its authority to stifle those practices. But a pluralist approach 
recognizes that such statements of normative commitment and authority are 
themselves subject to dispute. Accordingly, instead of clinging to the vain 
hope that unitary, positivist claims to authoritative law can ever be definitive, 
pluralism recognizes the inevitability (if not always the desirability) of 
hybridity. Pluralism is thus principally a descriptive, not a normative, 
framework. It observes that various actors pursue norms and it studies the 
interplay, but it does not propose a hierarchy of substantive norms and values.  
Nevertheless, while it does not offer substantive norms, a pluralist 
approach may favor procedural mechanisms and institutions that provide 
opportunities for plural voices. Such procedures can potentially help to 
channel (or even tame) normative conflict to some degree by bringing 
multiple actors together into a shared social space. This commitment can, of 
course, have strong normative implications because it asks decisionmakers 
and institutional designers to at least consider the independent value of 
pluralism. For example, we might favor a hybrid domestic-international 
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tribunal over either a fully domestic or fully international one because it 
includes a more diverse range of actors, or we might favor complementarity or 
subsidiarity regimes because they encourage dialogue among multiple 
jurisdictions, and so on. But Cover, and pluralism more generally, denies that 
a single “world public order” of the sort contemplated by the New Haven 
School is achievable, even assuming it were desirable. 
Interestingly, while applying Cover’s insights to the global arena has 
benefits for scholars of law and globalization, such an application may also 
provide a useful site for testing Cover’s ideas. After all, as noted previously, 
Cover generally assumed that “official” norm givers—most notably nation-
state courts—were jurispathic. Thus, in Cover’s view, these judges necessarily 
were forced to impose one normative worldview, thereby “kill[ing]” 
alternative interpretations.135 In contrast, Cover did not focus as much on the 
possibility that official law itself could sometimes act in a way that was 
jurisgenerative.136 Transferring Cover’s insights to the international arena tests 
that notion because in the realm of international law, we find statements of 
norms that are generally accompanied by less coercive power. In such a 
context, the question is whether law can be jurisgenerative without being 
jurispathic. An international legal pronouncement generally does not “kill off” 
competing interpretations; it simply adds new voices to debates. This is not 
always the case, of course.137 And it is also true that jurispathic activity is 
inevitable, as Cover recognized,138 in any adjudication of conflict. But at the 
very least asking the question would encourage scholars to tease out the 
interplay of jurisgenerative and jurispathic activities in the global arena and to 
think about institutional designs for handling the hybrid reality of a plural 
normative order.139 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The New Haven School of International Law opened up the study of 
international law to social processes of decisionmaking and the importance of 
actors beyond nation-states. As such, the scholars of this era provided a 
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significant and necessary response to international relations realists of the 
time. Now, however, as the study of state-to-state international law transforms 
into the study of law and globalization more generally, scholars interested in 
law in the global arena might wish to study Robert Cover’s legal pluralism 
alongside the insights of McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, and their colleagues. 
And while Harold Hongju Koh’s Transnational Legal Process framework was 
erected from an artful combination of Cover and the New Haven School, it 
may now be time to take Cover’s pluralist insights even more firmly to heart. 
By studying the many local settings in which the norms of multiple 
communities—geographical, ethnic, national, and epistemic—become 
operative, scholars can gain a far more nuanced understanding of the 
international and transnational legal terrain. This is a world in which claims to 
coercive power, abstract notions of legitimacy, and arguments about legal 
authority are only part of an ongoing conversation, not the final determining 
factors. It is a world where jurisgenerative practices proliferate, creating 
opportunities for contestation and creative adaptation. And though we may not 
like all the norms being articulated at any given moment, it will do no good to 
ignore them or insist on their lack of authority. In a plural world, law is an 
ongoing process of articulation, adaptation, re-articulation, absorption, 
resistance, deployment, and on and on. It is a process that never ends, and 
international law scholars would do well to study the multiplicity and engage 
in the conversation, rather than impose a top-down framework that cannot 
help but distort the astonishing variety on the ground. 
